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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The tax saving was produced because the specific legatees were Class B and C
beneficiaries, while the residuary legatee was a Class A beneficiary. Charging federal
taxes against the gross specific bequests resulted in smaller net bequests to which the
state inheritance tax could be applied. The net residuary estate, on the other hand,
was larger because the deduction for the payment of the federal taxes had been taken
from the respective specific bequests. Since the inheritance tax rates for Class B and
C beneficiaries are considerably more than those for Class A beneficiaries, the end
result is a successfully executed plan for inheritance tax diminution.
Caveat: An amendment to the inheritance tax code, Wash. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 280,
§ 3, is currently being held in abeyance by Referendum No. 30. If this referendum is
defeated and the amendment goes into effect, the deduction for payment of federal
estate taxes will no longer be available. Thus, the tax saving plan outlined above
would be ineffective.
Business and Occupation Tax-Frozen Food Processing as "Manufacturing." In
Stokely-Van Camp v. State, 50 Wn2d 492, 312 P.2d 816 (1957), the Washington
supreme court was called upon to determine whether the state tax commission, by
a recent ruling, properly classified the processing and freezing of foods as manufac-
turing for purposes of the state occupation tax. The court sustained the action of
the commission by applying the definition of "manufacturing" set out in RCW 82.04.120.
This definition requires that the activity in question result in "...a new, different or
useful article of tangible personal property or substance of trade or commerce." Under
this test, the canning of food products had been classified as "manufacturing" for some
time. The court stated that, by similarly classifying the processing and freezing of
foods, the commission was only recognizing the existence and growth of a new type
of manufacturing.
The court reconciled the Stokely case with two recent Federal circuit court decisions
(holding that the processing and freezing of certain foods was not manufacturing) by
showing that the federal cases involved merely a determination for the I.C.C. in a
carrier dispute and that in those cases the circuit courts did not have a specific statu-
tory definition to apply.
TORTS
Strict Liability Disguised in Terms of Negligence. In LeMaster
v. Chandler' the Washington supreme court made an unusual applica-
tion of tort liability to a defendant common carrier. The result of the
case is a holding of strict liability, disguised in terms of negligence
law. Unfortunately, the negligence reasoning was not in accord with
accepted tort law, and the disguise is easily uncovered.
The plaintiff was the owner of a truck loaded with apples, which
was parked twenty-five feet from the bow of the defendant's ferry
prior to a crossing of the Columbia River. The driver, who remained
in the truck, neglected to put it in gear or to set the brakes. The
defendant's employee neglected to block the wheels of the truck. Dur-
ing the crossing the truck rolled off the ferry with the driver still in the
'.50 Wn.2d 71, 309 P.2d 384 (1957).
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cab. The plaintiff brought action to recover for damage to the truck
and for loss of the apples. The trial court found the defendant negli-
gent but held that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff barred
recovery. On appeal the court reversed, holding that the defendant,
as a common carrier, had a duty to anticipate that the plaintiff would
negligently fail to provide for his own safety, and that failure to com-
ply with this duty by providing the proper safeguards rendered the
defendant liable. The court further said that the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff was not a bar because it was the very thing which
the defendant owed a duty to guard against. Consequently it was
not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss. The case was remanded
for a new trial limited to the issue of damages.
Even though a defendant may have the duty to anticipate negligence
on the part of a plaintiff, a breach of that duty should not result in
liability, as the Washington court found, but should result only in a
finding of negligence." The plaintiff's contributory negligence should
bar recovery absent a showing of reckless conduct on the defendant's
part.
Contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff bars recovery in
this state when it is a proximate cause of the accident.3 The supreme
court in the instant case, however, seemed to believe that either the
negligence of the plaintiff or the defendant must be the proximate
cause of the accident. The court stated that to hold that the acts of
the driver were the proximate cause of the loss would place the responsi-
bility of keeping vehicles on the ferry upon the driver and thus detract
from the burden which the law casts upon common carriers.
2 A duty to anticipate negligent conduct is normally applied only in the cases where
the defendant actor creates a situation which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
another because of the expectable negligent conduct of a third party. See Neering v.
Illinois Central R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 290, comment (b) states: "if the known or knowable pecu-
liarities of even a small percentage of human beings or of a particular individual or
class of individuals are such as to lead the actor to realize the chance of eccentric and
improper action, he is required to take this into account if serious harm to a legally
important interest is likely to result from such eccentric action and his own conduct
has not suich a preeminent social utility as to justify the serious character of the risk
involved therein. This is often expressed by the statement that in such case the actor
is bound to anticipate and provide against the negligent or intentional misconduct of
the other or a third person."
The question of negligence is resolved by weighing the utility of the actor's conduct
against the extent of the chance of harm, the value of the interest to be protected, and
the extent of harm likely to be caused. It would seem that comment (b) above is taking
these factors into consideration in arriving at the conclusion reached. The duty of
anticipating another's negligence would therefore go only to determining the issue of
negligence not liability.
Everest v. Riecken, 26 Wn.2d 542, 174 P.2d 762 (1946); Kingxvell v. Hart, 45
NVn.2d 401, 275 P.2d 413 (1954).
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The facts of the case, as well as the decisions of both the trial and
the supreme court, clearly show that both parties were negligent.
Once negligence of the plaintiff is found, it need by only a proximate
and contributing cause of the resulting accident to bar the plaintiff's
recovery. It need not be the sole proximate cause.4 The whole theory
of contributory negligence is that the negligence of both parties has
contributed to the resulting injury, and thus neither should be allowed
to recover. Clearly, the accident was in fact caused by the negligence
of both parties. The result was within the scope of the risk created
by the negligent conduct of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Ac-
cordingly, contributory negligence should have barred recovery unless
the plaintiff was able to find another avenue of escape. The opinion
of the court indicates that an avenue could be found in the doctrine
of last clear chance.
Normally, if the last clear chance doctrine is to apply, the plaintiff
must show that he was in an inescapable position of peril brought about
by his own negligence, and that the defendant, in the exercise of rea-
sonable care, had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. The de-
fendant must, however, have a last clear chance, not merely a last pos-
sible chance.
There are four fact situations in which the last clear chance doctrine
has normally been applied.5 The facts of this case do not conform
4 The reasoning of the court is faulty in determining that the plaintiff's negligence
did not here contribute to the cause of the accident. Had the plaintiff been driving a
bus loaded with school children and his conduct had been identical to that of the driver
in the instant case, it seems inconceivable that the plaintiff bus company would have
been found not liable in a wrongful death or survival action brought on behalf of one
of the children.
Cases which are analogous to this situation are those where there are joint tort-
feasors who through their negligence have each contributed to the accident. In these
cases each tortfeasor is totally responsible, provided his negligence is found to have
contributed substantially to the injury. See Mitchell v. Rogers, 37 Wn2d 630, 225 P.2d
1074 (1950).
5 The four categories are listed in 2 HARaE ANM JAMEs, LA,,W OF ToRTs § 22.13
(1956). They are substantially as follows:
(1) Plaintiff is in peril and unable to escape, and defendant knows of plaintiff's peril
and realizes or has reason to realize his danger, and defendant thereafter could
have avoided the injury by exercising reasonable care.
(2) Plaintiff is in peril and unable to escape, and defendant although not discovering
this position of plaintiff would have discovered and appreciated it in time to
avoid the accident had he exercised reasonable care.
(3) Plaintiff is not helpless but merely inattentive, and defendant knows or has
reason to know of this inattention, and thereafter by exercising reasonable care
could have avoided the accident
(4) Where both defendant and plaintiff are negligently inattentive, but defendant,
had he been exercising reasonable care, would have realized plaintiff's position
in time to avoid the injury.
Of these four categories, Washington and the majority of courts have adopted the first
three. Very few jurisdictions have accepted the fourth.
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with any of these categories. Instead, this case falls within that line of
cases in which the defendant, because of his prior negligence, did
not in fact have an opportunity to avoid injury to a negligent plain-
tiff at the critical moment. The great majority of cases refuse to
hold the defendant liable in this instance. A leading case, which
takes the opposite position, is British Columbia Electric R.R. Co.
v. Loach.' The doctrine of this case has been rejected as recently as
1955 by the Washington court.' The basic reasoning of the Loach
rule is that where the defendant has so incapacitated himself by his
prior negligence that he is unable to avail himself of the last clear
chance, he will nevertheless be regarded as having had the last chance.
This rule produces harsh results unon a defendant by removing the
bar of contributory negligence. The rule has been used by courts when
the defendant was the owner of a dangerous instrumentality such as
a train or other carrier difficult to control. In these instances it would
seem that courts felt the risk-bearing loss was more appropriately
shifted to the defendant.
The Virginia case of Cheasapeake Ferry Co. v. Cummings8 provided
the basic support for the decision of the Washington court in the
instant case. However, the Virginia case in turn relied upon the
Loack case, which the Washington court had previously rejected.
Thus the unusual situation is presented in which an authority ex-
pressly rejected obtains approval and is given controlling effect by
indirection.9
The Washington court, by allowing recovery in this case, would
31 A.C. 719 (1916). This case and its doctrine have been criticised by various
writers. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 52 (2d.ed. 1955) ; Bohlen, 66 U. OF PA. L. REv.
73 (1917) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 479, comment f (1934). The doctrine is peculiarly
adaptable to the Missouri humanitarian doctrine, which few American courts have seen
fit to follow. See Krause v. Pictcairn, 350 Mo. 339, 167 S.W.2d 74 (1942) ; Becker,
The Humanitarian Doctrine, 3 Mo. L. REv. 392 (1938).7 Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn.2d 323, 287 P.2d 472 (1955). This case cited with
approval RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 479, comment f as follows: "If the defendant after
discovering the plaintiff's peril, does all that can reasonably be expected of him, the
fact that his efforts are defeated by antecedent lack of preparation or a previous course
of negligent conduct is not sufficient to make him liable. All that is required of him
is that he use carefully his then available ability."
s158 Va. 33, 164 S.E. 281, 82 A.L.R. 790 (1932).
9 The Cummings case is further distinguishable because the trial court there had
found the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent and the appellate court affirmed.
The trial court in the instant case found the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and
the supreme court reversed. The Virginia court was unwilling to find the plaintiff
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Washington court found the plaintiff
was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law. There is a vast difference between
the two positions. The discussion in the Cummings case on last clear chance and
proximate causation would seem to be dictum since the court was unwilling to over-
rule the trial court on the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
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seem to be accepting the theory of the Loach case. Possibly, however,
the quotation from the Loach case in the opinion can be dismissed
as dictum since the court had ruled the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence was not the proximate cause of the accident. Hopefully, the
court, as well as the bar, will place the latter construction upon the
court's quotation from the case. The rule, if accepted by the Wash-
ington court, is not supported by logic or on the basis of fault. The
only justification for the rule is that, as between the litigating parties,
the defendant is better able to withstand the loss. The decision
demonstrates how fully negligence concepts can be expanded both
logically and illogically in order to compensate a party plaintiff.
Harper and James, in their recent treatise on tort law," point out that
in the years to come we may expect many results which do not fit
the logic of fault at all but make sense only in terms of compensa-
tion. It would seem that the Washington court has arrived at those
years to come with their decision in the instant case.
An alternative basis for liability in this case, by which the above
misconstructions of negligence law could have been avoided, would
have been to hold the defendant common carrier strictly liable as
an insurer. The liability of a common carrier for goods lost or damaged
in transit is that of an insurer unless the loss is occasioned by an act
of God, public enemy, or the wilful default of the shipper. 1 The
standard of care required of a carrier in Washington toward a
passenger is the highest degree of care consistent with the practical
operation of the business.' Since the action involved in the instant
case was for the recovery of damages to property, the court might
well have imposed an insurer's standard rather than the standard of
care which is owed to a passenger. 8
However, in order to impose strict liability as an insurer against the
defendant on these facts, the court would have been required to reject
an exception which some courts have engrafted on to the strict liability
at least in ferryman cases. This exception is that when the goods
10 2 HARPER & JAMES, LA-W oF TORTs § 16.12 (1956).
119 Am. Jma, Carriers § 661; Bean v. Hinson, (Tex.Civ.Sup.), 235 S.W. 327 (1921).
The Washington court has not explicitly adopted this rule although a number of cases
speak of "common law liability" in the carrier situation. See Fisher v. Northern Pac.
R.R. Co., 49 Wash. 28, 94 Pac. 1073 (1908) ; Lagomarsino v. Pacific, 100 Wash. 105.
170 Pac. 368 (1918).
12 McLain v. Easley, 146 Wash. 377, 262 Pac. 975 (1928) ; Wood v. Washington
Navigation Co., 1 Wn.2d 324, 95 P.2d 1019 (1939).
13 If the Washington court is following a rule that a common carrier is charged with
the same degree of care as to goods transported as it is to a passenger, it has failed to
announce this change. Liability as an insurer is the general rule with respect to zoodr-
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remain under the control of the shipper, the strict liability rule is not
applicable and the ordinary rules of negligence apply.14 The better
rule, in line with the common law basis of a carrier's strict liability,
would be an adoption of this exception.'" The courts are, however,
divided on its adoption and our court would not be required to follow
those who apply it.' This alternative basis of strict liability, coupled
with a rejection of the exception, would place upon the defendant
in the instant case the liability of an insurer of the plaintiff's apples
and truck. The result reached would be the same result of strict
liability which the court reached in the instant case, without the dis-
tortion of rules of negligence.
The Washington court, by reaching liability through negligence, has
refused to apply strict liability as such when its application, under
the facts, seems to have been appropriate. The court chose instead
to hide the strict liability behind a negligence disguise. The same
technique seems to have been used in another recent Washington
case where the court used the disguise of res ipsa loquitur.'7 This
practice is not desirable. If it were discontinued, the law would be
less prone to encourage litigation and more likely to encourage prompt
settlement of proper claims.
False Imprisonment-Arrest Without a Warrant in Misdemeanor
Cases. In Sennett v. Zimmerman' the Washington supreme court has
perpetuated an error committed in an earlier case' involving arrest
14 Mercer v. Christiana Ferry Co., 34 Del. 490, 155 Atl. 596, 82 A.L.R. 798 (1930).
If the exception were applied, contributory negligence would bar recovery unless the
direct cause of the loss was the omission of the ferryman, after becoming aware of the
owner's negligence, to use a proper degree of care to avoid the consequences of such
negligence. See 22 Am. Jum., Ferries § 48.
Ir Mercer v. Christiana Ferry Co., 34 Del. 490, 155 Atl. 596, 82 A.L.R. 798 (1930).
The policy reasons of collusion with robbers and difficulty of proof of negligence which
lay behind the insurer's liability at common law are not applicable when the control of
the goods remains with the shipper.
1622 Am. Jun., Ferries § 43; 81 A.L.R. 819. A rejection of the exception would not
be difficult to justify, especially in the instant case. Normally a carrier to bring himself
within one of the exceptions of act of God, default of shipper, or act of public enemy
must demonstrate that he was free from any negligence which contributed to the acci-
dent. There seems to be no reason why this rule should not be the same where the
shipper accompanies the goods. Also there are difficult problems of proof as to when
the goods have been transferred to the possession and control of the carrier. This is
especially true where the shipper sends along an employee merely for the purpose of
caring for the shipped goods.
17 Kind v. City of Seattle, 50 NVn.2d 485, 312 P.2d 811 (1957).
150 Wn.2d 649, 314 P.2d 414 (1957). "
2Coles v. McNamara, 131 Wash. 377, 230 Pac. 430 (1924) ; 136 Wash. 624, 241 Pac.
1(1925).
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without a warrant in misdemeanor cases. The court has thus made it
clear that a police officer is now privileged to make an arrest without
a warrant for any misdemeanor which he reasonably believes is being
committed in his presence. This rule is practically the antithesis of
the common law rule and points out the need in this state for a statutory
codification of the privilege of arrest without a warrant in both felony
and misdemeanor cases.'
The plaintiff in this case was arrested, on an accusation of shoplifting,
by the defendant's store detective, who was also a deputized city police
officer. He was tried and acquitted on a charge of petit larceny and
brought this action for false imprisonment. The trial court rendered
judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the issue was whether probable
cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being committed in the presence
of an officer is sufficient to allow the officer to arrest an innocent person
without a warrant. The supreme court reversed the trial court and
remanded the case with directions to give an instruction on the issue
of probable cause. A petition for rehearing was denied.'
The common law rule of arrest was that a police officer had the
privilege to arrest for a misdemeanor which amounted to a breach of
the peace and which was committed in his presence.' This rule was
partially abrogated in Washington in State v. Dietz,6 which held that
the right to arrest existed even though the misdemeanor committed in
the officer's presence was not a breach of the peace. This seems to have
been the first case in any jurisdiction to make this direct holding
without statutory support. The case was supported by what one
author7 believes was dictum in Carroll v. U.S.' This modification is in
line with statutory law of other states on the subject.9 These statutes,
however, limit the privilege to serious misdemeanors, not to any mis-
demeanor.
Sennett v. Zimmerman reiterates the rule of State v. Dietz,10 and
3 See for example the following typical arrest statutes: CAL. PEN CODE. § 836
(1951); IDAHO PEN. CODE ANN. § 19-603 (1948) ; GA. CODE. ANN. § 27-207 (1953) ;
ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 44-124 (1939) ; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 13432-1 (1939). For other
applicable code provisions adopted prior to 1954, see 33 N.C.L. REv. 17, footnotes 19
through 26.
4 151 Wash. Dec. 260 (1957).
5 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 121, comment e (1934).
6 136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925).
7 Bohlen and Shulman, Arrest With and Without a Warrant, 75 U. OF PA. L. Rxv.
485 (1927).
8 267 U.S. 137 (1925).
9 Supra, note 2.
10 136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925).
[SUME
19 ASHINGTON CASE LAW-1957
further modifies the common law rule. As stated above, under the rule
of this case, the officer may arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant
when he has reasonable cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being
committed in his presence. In support of the modification, the court
cited Coles v. McNamara." In that case the plaintiff's action was also
for false imprisonment. The trial court rendered judgment for the
plaintiff and on appeal the case was remanded for a new trial." The
court, relying on White v. Jensen,3 held that the jury should have
been instructed on the issue of whether the defendant had reasonable
cause for believing and did believe the plaintiff committed the offense
charged." The court's reliance on White v. Jensen 5 was erroneous.
That case involved an arrest for a felony and not a misdemeanor, and
had correctly stated the common law rule of arrest for a felony. The
Jensen case was also distinguishable because a John Doe warrant had
been issued, which would make the arrest privileged if the officer rea-
sonably believed the person arrested was the person intended under the
description in the warrant.' These points, if brought to the court's
attention in the instant case, would have been sufficient to put the court
on notice of the weakness of Coles v. McNamara as a precedent.
Although the doctrine of stare decisis lends support to the court's
opinion in the instant case, the author believes the court should have
overruled Coles v. McNamara because of the obvious error committed
by the court in that case. The court then could have followed the
earlier decision in Mitchell v. Hughes," which held that an officer may
not arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant, on information or
suspicion, unless the misdemeanor was actually committed in his pres-
ence." This case was distinguished by the court in the Sennett case on
11 131 Wash. 377, 230 Pac. 162 (1924); 136 Wash. 624, 241 Pac. 1 (1925).
12131 Wash. 377, 230 Pac. 162 (1924).
1381 Wash. 435, 142 Pac. 1140 (1914).
14 On remand judgment was for the defendant and on appeal the court affirmed, 136Wash. 624, 241 Pac. 1 (1925). The court said the instruction on the issue of reason-
able cause conformed to the law of the case as settled on the former appeal. It should
be noted that the first appeal was the case which actually made the holding the court
relied on in the instant case. The second appeal merely affirmed an instruction which
had become the law of the case. The court in the instant case, however, cited the
second appeal as their authority. If the court had read the first opinion carefully, a
different result may have been reached.
15 81 Wash. 435, 142 Pac. 1140 (1914).
10 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 125 (a), comment g (1934).
17 104 Wash. 231, 176 Pac. 26 (1918).
8 8 Mitchell v. Hughes, 104 Wash. 231, 176 Pac. 26 (1918), was not discussed in the
McNamara case. The rule has been reiterated in two other cases cited in the opinion
of the instant case. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922), and Tacoma
v. Houston, 27 Wn.2d 215, 177 P.2d 886 (1947). The authority of the Mitchell case
in these latter cases is questionable in that they were not actions for false arrest.
1958]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the basis that the officer was relying on information received from a
third person and that the conduct which gave rise to the belief that an
offense was being committed did not take place in the officer's
presence. Why this particular fact is a relevant distinction was not
explained by the court. Also, a careful reading of the opinion will
show that the conduct for which the arrest was made did take place in
the presence of the arresting officer. Furthermore, the rule in the
Mitchell case was that the arrest could not be made on information or
suspicion unless the misdemeanor was actually committed in the
officer's presence.
The rule is not supported by Garske v. U.S.,19 cited by the court
in their opinion. That case is not in point as it did not involve an action
for false arrest. The defendant had been convicted of the crime for
which he was arrested and was appealing on the ground that the evi-
dence was inadmissible. The case is authority only for the proposition
that evidence obtained by an officer, who arrests without a warrant a
guilty person who he reasonably believes is committing a misdemeanor,
is admissible against that person in a criminal prosecution. It does not
state the rule that reasonable belief is a defense to an action for false
arrest of an innocent person. At best, it is weak dictum in support of
the rule applied in the instant case."0
The only decisions in other states supporting this case are those
wherein the legislature has abrogated some of the common law rules
by statute."' The rule has some justification as a modern view of the
law of arrest,22 because otherwise officers would be reluctant to make
arrests for fear that they would be liable for having made an honest
and reasonable mistake." This factor must, however, be weighed
against the infringement on individuals' rights. Also, a misdemeanor
is often not so serious that fear of escape, pending issuance of a war-
rant, is as manifest as in the felony cases. There are certain misde-
meanors involving the violation of a municipal ordinance or adminis-
trative ruling which are not even remotely connected with the breach
'9 1 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1924).
20 The author was unable to find any federal cases directly in point with the decision
of the Washington court. See, Anderson v. Sager, 173 F2d 794 (8th Cir. 1949), where
the arrest was held to have been made without probable cause.
"1 Ryan v. Conover, 59 Ohio App. 361, 18 N.E.2d 277 (1938) ; Hill v. Day, 168 Kan.
604, 215 P.2d 219 (1950) ; Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478, 152 P.2d 886 (1944). See also
cases cited in Brief of Appellant 934080, p. 43-44.
22 Uniform Arrest Law, 28 VA. L. Rav. 315 (1942).
23 50 Wn.2d 649, 314 P2d 414, 416 (1957).
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of the peace requirement at common law. The rule, as stated by the
court, would extend the privilege to these minor misdemeanors.
The legislature in this state has shown no inclination to change the
common law privilege of arrest without a warrant. Perhaps this is
because the court has been so willing to modify the rules without legis-
lative authorization. This is in spite of the fact that the role of changing
common law rules, when necessary to meet the change in times, is
normally left with the legislative branch of government. Although
the extension of the privilege on the particular facts of this case may
be justified, it is believed that the duty to substitute a modern law of
arrest for the common law rules rests upon the legislative branch
rather than the judicial branch exercising their "legislative functions."
The problem of determining in what circumstances and for what
crimes police officers should have the authority to make arrests on
their own initiative, without a warrant from an official of the judicial
branch of government, is difficult. It requires the consideration of
many factors which are important in keeping the processes for the
administration of justice properly balanced as between the rights of
the individual and the needs of the state.24 The rule which the court
has stated is entirely too broad in scope. The rule would encompass
every misdemeanor; many in which the rights of the individual would
far outweigh the needs of the state to arrest without a warrant. Because
of the nature of the problem, it is submitted that detailed, specific rules
and statutory regulation are required. The legislative process is much
better equipped than the judiciary to state a law of arrest which can
be appropriately adapted to the varying fact situations of cases pre-
sented to the court. The court may find the present rule difficult to
apply when a case, not properly calling for arrest without a warrant,
is presented to them. CHARLES J. MCMURCHIE
Liability Without Fault and Res Ipsa Loquitur. Kind v. City of Seattle, 50 Wn2d
485, 312 P.2d 811 (1957), was an action to recover for damage to property flooded by
water from a burst water main owned and operated by the defendant. The cause of
the break was unknown, but an investigation, not completed at the time of the trial,
indicated due care on the part of the defendant. The trial court found that the defend-
ant was not negligent, but was liable without fault. The trial judge's memorandum
decision indicated the court would have applied res ipsa loquitur except that it had
misconstrued the doctrine by a belief that plaintiff's prima facie case was not sufficient
evidence to get the case to the jury.
HELD: On appeal, affirmed. The court refused to decide whether the case called
24 Machen, Arrest Without a Warrant in Misdemeanor Cases, 33 N.C.L. REv. 17
(1954).
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for an application of liability without fault under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher,
3 H.L. 330 (1868), since they believed the decision could be affirmed by applying res
ipsa loquitur. Although the defendant's investigation indicated due care, this was
insufficient to overcome plaintiff's prima facie case.
The majority, by applying res ipsa loquitur when the trial court had found liability
without fault, does not seem to have recognized that the two doctrines usually rest
on opposing grounds: one that accidents do not normally occur unless the defendant
was negligent, and the other that accidents will occur even if all due care is exercised.
In line with the Washington court's position that legal control, rather than actual
control, is sufficient for an application of res ipsa loquitur (see 32 WASH. L. REv. 133),
the record seems to justify the court's holding. However, the case did present facts
which called for a square holding on the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher. If the court had
met that issue, they could have clarified an area of law which is now open to conjec-
ture and which may prove to be the subject of much future litigation.
Termination of Passenger-Carrier Relationship. In Peterson v. City of Seattle, 151
Wash. Dec. 166, 316 P.2d 904 (1957), the plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's bus, was
required to leave the bus when it was unable to climb a hill in the snow. The plaintiff,
while walking from the bus around a parked car to the sidewalk, slipped and fell. This
action was brought to recover for the injuries sustained. Judgment was for the plaintiff
and defendant appealed.
HELD: Affirmed. The defendant carrier, in the exercise of the highest degree of
care consistent with the practical operation of the business, should have escorted the
plaintiff to a place of safety. At this point the passenger-carrier relationship would
have terminated. When the passenger was discharged in an unsafe place, the relation-
ship was not terminated until the passenger, in the exercise of ordinary care, had a
reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety. Because the defendant was negligent
and the passenger-carrier relationship had not terminated, the city was liable.
The case is one of first impression in Washington. The holding is consistent with
the high degree of care with which courts are inclined to charge common carriers, and
was supported by decisions in other jurisdictions.
Libel Per Se. In the recent case of Spangler v. Glover, 50 Wn2d 473, 313 P2d 354
(1957), the court considered the question of libel per se. Defendant-appellant Glover,
an officer of a labor union, was under attack and a recall movement was under way.
His supporters caused to be published a pamphlet which was the basis of the instant
action. The plaintiffs-respondents were not named in the document but the jury found
on adequate evidence that they were the persons referred to. The lower court ren-
dered a judgment in favor of each of the two plaintiffs in the amount of $1,500 each.
On appeal the defendant attempted to center the argument around the question of
whether the statements were directed at the plaintiffs personally or were merely attacks
on the prior accusations made by the plaintiffs. The defendant argued that prior to the
publication in question, the plaintiffs had published a petition for Glover's recall, in
which it was implied that Glover had communistic leanings. The defendant complained
that the court was requiring him to show the truth of his statement that the plantiffs
told a slanderous lie, which would entail a showing that, for example, the defendant
was not a Communist-obviously a task which was nearly impossible. The minority
of the court accepted this argument, but the majority passed it over, and said that
other statements in the publication, having been made in a predominately union locality,
were damaging enough to constitute libel per se.
Guest Statute-Applicability to Accidents on Private Roads. The recent case of
Becket v. Hutchinson, 49 Wn.2d 888, 308 P.2d 235 (1957), involved the question of
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whether the 1937 Washington Host-Guest Statute had repealed the 1933 Washington
Host-Guest Statute.
The litigation arose from an accident in which the plaintiff was injured while riding
in the defendant's car. The accident had occurred while the car was being driven along
a private road. In plaintiff's subsequent negligence action, verdict and judgment were
rendered in favor of the defendant upon the ground that the 1933 Host-Guest Statute
precluded plaintiff from recovering. Plaintiff appealed, contending (1) the 1937 Host-
Guest Statute was applicable only to accidents occurring upon public highways; (2) the
1937 statute impliedly repealed the 1933 statute which admittedly had applied to acci-
dents occurring upon private roads; (3) therefore, no statute conferred upon defendant
an immunity from suit.
HELD: Judgment for defendant affirmed. The court reasoned that if the 1937 act did
apply only to public highway accidents (an issue not decided by the court), then it did
not repeal the 1933 act by implication since the 1933 act clearly applied to private road
accidents. The 1933 act was not clearly inconsistent with the coverage of the 1937 act.
Moreover, the 1937 act did not explicitly repeal the 1933 act. Consequently, the instruc-
tions to the jury, which had been based upon the 1933 act, were not erroneous even if
plaintiff's construction of the 1937 act were adopted.
This decision presents the possibility that the 1937 Act (as amended by Laws of
1957, c. 132, § 1; RCW 46.08.080) subsequently may be held to apply only to public
highway accidents, while the 1933 act applies to private road accidents. The result of
such a construction of the two acts would be that the rules concerning immunity vel non,
and evidence requirements, which are applicable to public highway accidents, would
be considerably different from those applicable to private road accidents.
TRUSTS
Resulting Trusts-Purchase Money Paid by Resulting Trustee
as Loan to Beneficiary. In Mading v. McPhaden' the defendant
McPhaden, a partner in a money-lending partnership, has been acting
as Mading's agent in an attempt to purchase certain real estate. The
negotiations had reached an apparent stalemate when, unknown to
Mading, the vendors informed McPhaden that the asking price was
down $5,000.00. McPhaden immediately bought at the lower price
in his own name and reconveyed at a higher price to Mading-keeping
the $5,000.00 as "profit." The consideration paid by McPhaden had
been in two equal parts: (1) a note from Mading to the vendor,
secured by a mortgage on the subject real estate, and (2) a check
drawn on McPhaden's partnership account, but held by the court to
be part of a loan from McPhaden to Mading. Mading sued to recover
the "profit" on theories that included resulting and constructive trusts.
On appeal the supreme court, reversing the lower court, held that
there had been error in not raising the resulting trust. The conclusion
then followed that if Mading became the beneficial owner at the time
150 Wn.2d 48, 308 P.2d 963 (1957).
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